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WHEN IT’S ALL SAND AND DUNE 
A look at whether the government’s sand dune construction on 
private property requires compensation 
 
Jason Cherchia 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 The issue of property protection has grown in importance since Hurricane Sandy. Per 
mile of coast, New Jersey has the highest amount of property at risk from coastal flooding.
1
 
Every year, during hurricane season, New Jersey residents and property owners must hold their 
breath, hoping that a hurricane does not come up the coast and wreak havoc on the shore. It 
appeared that another bullet was dodged in 2012 until the end of October, when Hurricane Sandy 
travelled up the US coast and caused $36.8 billion
2
 worth of destruction. Thus the issue of 
property protection is critical to shore culture.  
 Cornelia Dean, in her writings on coastal erosion notes three methods for dealing with the 
problem: armor, beach nourishment, and retreat.
3
 Before the twentieth century, retreat was the 
most common method as people recognized they did not have the resources or technology to 
protect coastal property.
4
 As recently as fifty years ago in some parts of the country, residents 
along the Mid-Atlantic coast, which is often affected by major storms, decided to abandon their 
                                                 
1 The Effects of Recent Coastal Storms on the Beaches and Dunes along the New Jersey Shore: Hearing before the 
State Beach Erosion Comm’n, 37 (N.J. 1998), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/Pubhear/030498dt.PDF.  
2 Terrence Dopp, Christie Says New Jersey Sandy Damage No $36.8 Billion, BLOOMBERG. (Nov. 28, 2012, 3:48 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-28/christie-says-new-jersey-s-sandy-damage-rises-to-36-8-
billion.html [hereinafter State Beach Erosion Comm’n]. The figure represents funds that will be necessary to rebuild 
and prevent future damage.  
3 CORNELIA DEAN, AGAINST THE TIDE: THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S BEACHES 185 (1999). 
4 Id. 
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property when they realized that they would have a difficult time protecting it.
5
 However, more 
recently, as coastal land grows in value, so does the property that sits on it, making it more 
worthwhile to protect.
6
  
As a result, in 1972, Congress adopted the Coastal Zone Management Act in order to 
provide states with a framework with which they can protect their shoreline.
7
 The CMZA 
recognizes the national need to “preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or 
enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and succeeding generations.”8 It does 
so by encouraging states to implement a program of coastal management that protect, among 
other things, beaches and sand dunes in particular.
9
 Furthermore, the CMZA envisions 
participation by the state and local governments and the public in development and execution of 
a plan to protect the coast.
10
 States have approached the beach armor task differently. Some have 
banned coastal armor, others require buildings to be set back a certain distance from the beach.
11
  
Part II of this paper will talk about the plan that New Jersey has implemented and 
executed in the last twenty years. It will also discuss what is necessary to construct a beach 
capable of protecting the property behind it and the problem that the state and municipalities 
have run into. Finally, this section will describe the problem that this paper will deal with, 
namely whether the government takes land requiring compensation. 
Part III will discuss relevant takings caselaw. It will discuss physical invasions and how 
the Court has shied away from announcing any bright-line rule for finding a taking. This section 
will present one argument, that while potentially futile before a court, would justify a finding that 
                                                 
5 Id. at 185-86. 
6 Id. at 187. 
7 Id. at 188. 
8 Coastal Zone Management Act (CMZA) of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (West, 1992). 
9 16 U.S.C.A. § 1452 (2)(a) (West, 1992). 
10 16 U.S.C.A. § 1452(4) (West, 1992). 
11 DEAN, supra note 3, at 189. 
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dune placement would not constitute a physical invasion. Sand dune projects should be 
characterized under this class of cases, rather than a physical invasion, because these projects 
better fit into this theory of cases, including the one espoused by following section. 
Part IV will discuss Lucas, Palazzolo, and the background principles theory. It is here 
that the dune projects implemented by New Jersey will likely succeed in court. This section will 
also offer examples of the application of the background principles theory of takings. 
Part V will discuss the background principles in New Jersey property law. These 
principles include those announced in New Jersey state court cases, as well as Supreme Court 
and other federal court decisions. This section will also present theories founded on state 
background principles that would justify a finding that no compensation is required for the 
state’s sand dune projects. 
Finally, Part VI will conclude and generally outline the arguments presented and provide 
a prediction on the future of the sand dune projects. 
II. The New Jersey Plan and the Problem 
Dean’s suggestion that sometimes the easiest practice is leaving, recognizing that 
property protection is too costly, is not feasible in New Jersey. In the late 1990s, New Jersey 
took in $15 billion in travel and tourism, a large part of that coming from the shore.
12
 That 
number nearly tripled in 2012 to nearly $45 billion.
13
 Surely there is a strong motivation to 
protect the homes, businesses, and other property from destruction. In many areas, the only 
feasible means of protection is by constructing sand dunes and replenishing the beach.  
First, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection adopted the Green Acres 
                                                 
12 State Beach Erosion Comm’n, supra note 1 at 3. 
13 Despite Sandy, Jersey Shore Sets Tourism Record with $40 Billion in Revenue, NJ Today (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.njtvonline.org/njtoday/2013/03/21/despite-sandy-jersey-shore-sets-tourism-record-with-40-billion-in-
revenue/. 
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Mission which is meant to preserve and create a system of state open spaces for public 
enjoyment by preventing new development.
14
 The Blue Acres program, a subset of Green Acres, 
deals with areas that tend to flood uses its limited budget to purchase areas prone to flooding 
from private owners and place them in the custody of the state.
15
 This would stop further 
development on the shore and prevent more property from being at risk. A proposal that is 
similar to the Blue Acres concept has been offered that would protect some of the areas along the 
coast, such as Whale Beach, discussed below, from commercial development.
16
 
To protect existing property, especially in Monmouth and Ocean Counties, where most of 
the shore is fully developed, the state has engaged in a process that engineers beaches. An 
engineered beach is one that has a specific cross section; it has a specific elevation and slope, and 
a profile so that it can be measured and replenished if necessary.
17
 The advantage to maintaining 
engineered beaches is that because the dimensions are measured, erosion is easily noticeable and 
problem areas can be identified relatively quickly.
18
 The state developed a plan with the Army 
Corps of Engineers to replenish beaches all along the New Jersey coastline under the Shore 
Protection Program.
19
 This process has a history of reducing storm damage and protect 
infrastructure.
20
  
 After two storms in 1998, a Cape May community, known as Whale Beach, saw erosion 
of dunes and subsequent ocean flooding across a main roadway. This is particularly dangerous, 
                                                 
14 Green Acres Program, NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, http://www.nj.gov/dep/ 
greenacres/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2013). 
15 Id. 
16 State Beach Erosion Comm’n, supra note 1, at 19 (1998). 
17 Id. at 11. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 16. 
20 Id. at 15-16. Early projects were completed in Ocean City and Sea Bright-Monmouth Beach. Eventually, the 
Monmouth County project was expanded to cover a greater area. These early projects demonstrated this scheme 
could be successful.  
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not only to property, but also because the roadway is a primary evacuation route for the area.
21
 
Where at one point in the 1970s, the sand was elevated enough to allow a beachgoer to walk 
directly up to a shoreline bunker (constructed during WWII), up until 2005 there was no access 
because too much sand has been washed away and the shoreline moved inward.
22
 In 2005, 
replenishment efforts moved the shoreline out and the encampment was reclaimed.
23
 Without 
protection or maintenance, the water will erode the beach, eventually exposing the bulkheads. If 
left untreated, erosion of materials behind the bulkhead will continue, which will eventually 
cause the bulkhead itself to fail.
24
 This is even more dangerous for houses that sit on pilings.
25
   
Sand dunes, therefore, are a critical component of the shoreline protection scheme. They 
work in conjunction with other elements including the bulkhead, stone revetment, and the beach 
berm to protect the shore.
26
 If one of those elements fails, the entire system is weakened and 
susceptible to flooding.
27
 Some erosion is natural and cyclical so that some of the sand washed 
away over the summer may be washed back in the winter, but the reality of erosion is that not all 
of it will come back, and some replenishment is necessary.
28
 Dunes need about 100 feet of beach 
or else everything that is put in will was away with the next major storm.
29
 Therefore, one cannot 
separate the importance of rebuilding dunes from the importance of rebuilding beach.  
Beach replenishment and protection, particularly the placement of sand dunes, is 
controversial. This is true, even in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, in which coastal areas protected 
                                                 
21 Id. at 12. 
22 Id. at 13. 
23 Battery 223, Cape May, New Jersey, http://www.stinch.com/military/battery223.html (last visited April 20, 2013). 
24 State Beach Erosion Comm’n, supra note 1, at 13. 
25 Id. at 14. 
26 A berm is a raised area of the beach, where there is a significant elevation, greater than the natural slope of the 
beach. A bulkhead is an underground foundation that supports the dune. The stone revetment serves as a foundation 
for the beach by sitting under the sand and prevents major erosion of the shore.  
27 State Beach Erosion Comm’n, supra note 1, at 45-46. 
28 Id. at 46. 
29 Id. at 51.  
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by sand dunes generally fared better than those left unprotected. Often, replenishment requires 
working with privately owned property. New Jersey is a high tide state, meaning that private 
owners can own to the high tide line. Easements are necessary to allow the government to 
manage the beach and maintain the dunes in perpetuity.
30
 As a result, many citizens are 
concerned. Dunes take up a large portion of some private owners’ property and some have been 
installed without an easement.
31
 As inducement, the municipalities sometimes allow for 
construction of a larger structure in return for the easement, but not every private owner receives 
that offer.
32
 In some cases, the state is vague about what the easement will allow the state to do 
or for how long it will last.
33
 The response, generally, by proponents of the government’s 
program is that easements are necessary to protect the shore; that the municipality is acting to 
protect everyone, including the owners with property behind the beachfront owners. They say 
that the beachfront owners should not be able to put inland property at risk.
34
  
Most residents of Jersey shore area communities want to allow the local and state 
governments to come in to replenish lost beaches and dunes while many others do not. The 
greatest obstacle to effective dune construction is the homeowner associations that do not want to 
let the government in. Some residents, realizing the potential for a calamity down the line, have 
come together to hire lawyers to force these associations to build dunes to prevent flooding.
35
  
Those in opposition argue that the government’s plan for dune placement is too vague 
                                                 
30 Testimony from invited individuals and the public on beach erosion and fisheries management issues; 
representatives from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the united States Army Corps of 
Engineers, local governments, academic institutions, and the fishing industry have been invited: Hearing before the 
Senate Env’t Comm 74 (N.J. 2006),  http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/sen080406.pdf. 
31 Id. at 53-61. 
32 Id. at 46. 
33 Id. at 58-59. 
34 Id. at 77. 
35 Watchdog: Residents Battle beach Owner for Storm Protection, ASBURY PARK PRESS (January 14, 2013), 
http://www.app.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2013301130033. 
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and that government access to their private property would not be limited enough.
36
 They also 
say that their property values will go down because they can’t build on all of their land or 
because they lose their views.
37
 As a result, they often want compensation from the state under a 
takings theory. This paper will discuss these cases, where the government enters without an 
easement and constructs the dune. Often, the government has attempted to come to an agreement 
with the owner, but ultimately, there is no agreement. It is difficult to deny that the government’s 
action is necessary. This shoreline protection scheme requires dunes to continuous so that they 
can effectively prevent flooding and storm surge from causing damage.  
If the systematic maintenance of dunes on private property and a prohibition on removal 
is a taking requiring compensation, the state’s program surely will be too expensive to be 
comprehensive and effective in protecting property. Therefore, the state’s program, in order to be 
cost effective, must not be considered a taking. This paper assumes that there is a public use and 
there would be a valid exercise of eminent domain should the government offer compensation, 
and will therefore not engage in a discussion of those issues. Clearly, the least adversarial way 
for the government to achieve its goal of shore protection would be to bargain for easements or 
offer compensation, but this paper is meant to engage in the intellectual exercise as to whether 
compensation is required when the government engages in this sort of action. Ultimately, after 
examining the issues below, there is no clear answer as to whether any of the theories would 
work or be accepted by the courts, so this paper will also discuss the merits of the government’s 
action and the fact that it is too important to protecting the public to be hindered by requiring 
compensation for unhappy property owners.  
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 These are the arguments that the owners made in suing the state for invading their property and placing sand 
dunes on them. See Klumpp v. Borough of Avalon, 997 A.2d 967, 970 (N.J. 2010); see also Borough of Harvey 
Cedars v. Karan, 40 A.3d 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
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III. Federal Takings Caselaw in the Context of Physical Invasions and Pre-Lucas Takings 
 There is no clear formula to determine when takings must be compensated by the 
government.
38
 The Fifth Amendment requires compensation for private owners when the 
government deprives them of their property.
39
 The purpose of the takings clause is to prevent 
some people from bearing a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.
40
 There are 
several that distinguish situations where compensation is required when an owner loses property 
rights from situations where compensation is not required. Because the sand dune placement and 
maintenance involve several different areas of takings law, several different areas of the law 
must be examined. 
 A physical invasion occurs when the government enters property and prevents the owner 
from exercising his property rights. Among a property owner’s general rights to his property 
include the right to use, the right to exclude, and the right to alienate. Several of those rights are 
injured after a physical invasion. Should this school of thought prevail, the state’s case probably 
will not succeed as it must enter a private owner’s property in order to construct a dune. It is also 
important to note that pre-Lucas caselaw did not establish a bright-line rule to determine when a 
taking occurred, particularly for regulatory takings. This question is important because many of 
the principles argued by the cases that do not discuss physical invasions are applicable to the 
hypothetical case of this paper. 
 In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, the Court rejected a state law that prevented a property 
owner from mining under his property in way that would remove the support and cause 
                                                 
38 Daniel J. Curtin, Jr.., Takings in the Land-Use Arena after Lucas and Dolan: How Far is Too Far in Exactions?, 
in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 83, 83 
(David L. Callies ed., 1996). 
39 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
40 Douglas W. Kmiec, At Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, in TAKINGS, supra note 38, at 107, 
107. 
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subsidence of the land.
41
 Justice Holmes made the important point that “some values are enjoyed 
under an implied limitation and must yield to police power.”42 The limitation must have its own 
limits, so the Court will consider the extent of diminution in value, but ultimately, each case is 
fact sensitive.
43
 The Court laid out the vague standard that “the general rule at least is that while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a 
taking.”44 In this case, there was a taking because there was no state interest that could justify the 
taking would warrant a taking because the regulation deprived the owner of the reason he 
purchased the property.
45
  In opposition, Justice Brandeis would have upheld the government’s 
regulation and stated that one’s right to use his land is not unlimited and that “he may not use it 
as to create a create a public nuisance, and uses, once harmless, may, owing to changed 
conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare.”46 
 Penn Central, one of the leading takings cases that set the Court on a path to developing a 
clearer standard, concerned a New York City law designed to protect historic landmarks.
47
 The 
law ultimately prevented the owner of Grand Central Station from his property above the 
existing structure.
48
 The city’s said the statute was necessary because:  
The city acted from the conviction that “the standing of [New York City] as a 
world-wide tourist center and world capital of business, culture and government” 
would be threatened if legislation were not enacted to protect historic landmarks 
and neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy or fundamentally alter 
their character. § 205–1.0(a). The city believed that comprehensive measures to 
safeguard desirable features of the existing urban fabric would benefit its citizens 
in a variety of ways: e. g., fostering “civic pride in the beauty and noble 
accomplishments of the past”; protecting and enhancing “the city's attractions to 
                                                 
41 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-13 (1922). 
42 Id. at 413. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 415 
45 Id. at 414 
46 Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
47 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978). The law in question was the Landmarks 
Preservation Law of 1965. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, CH. 8–A, § 205–1.0 et seq. (1976).  
48 Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 115-16. 
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tourists and visitors”; “support[ing] and stimul[ating] business and industry”; 
“strengthen[ing] the economy of the city”; and promoting “the use of historic 
districts, landmarks, interior landmarks and scenic landmarks for the education, 
pleasure and welfare of the people of the city.” § 205–1.0(b).49 
Additionally, the law requires the owner to preserve the character of the exterior and get the 
approval of Landmarks Preservation Commission to develop the site any further.
50
   
 Penn Central, the owner of the terminal, wanted to enter into a lease agreement that 
would allow the lessee to develop an office building above the terminal.
51
 The proposal was 
rejected by the Commission, which determined that it would be injurious to the aesthetic 
integrity of the terminal.
52
 The owner filed an appeal from the Commission’s decision, claiming 
that his property was taken without just compensation.
53
 Lower courts found in favor of the 
government, denying the owner’s claim.54 
 In determining that there was no taking, the Court noted it is much easier to find taking 
when there is a physical invasion of property rather than when government regulations affect the 
ability of a landowner to maximize the benefits of his property.
55
 It noted the impracticality of 
finding a taking every time a use was limited but where the owner still able to exercise his 
                                                 
49 Id. at 109. 
50 Id. at 111-12. If a landowner wants to alter its landmark site, there are three different procedures that can be used. 
The first involves applying to the Commission for a “certificate of no effect on protected architectural features” 
which involves approval for the improvement on the grounds that the landmark’s features will not be changed. The 
second method allows the owner to apply for a certificate of “appropriateness” which is granted when the values of 
the proposed construction would not hinder protection of the landmark. Finally, the last method is seeking approval 
on the grounds of “insufficient return” which helps to ensure that the landmark does not impose economic hardship 
on the owner. Id. 
51 Id. at 116. 
52 Id. at 117. 
53 Id. at 119. 
54 Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 119-22. The Appellate Division held that the restriction was necessary in order to 
protect the landmark and that the claim could only be proven by showing that the regulation deprived the owner of 
all beneficial use of the property. 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). The New York Court of Appeals also 
rejected the owner’s claim because there was no transfer of control of property to the city, but rather, a restriction of 
the owner’s ability to exploit his property. Furthermore, that court said there was no denial of due process because 
the landmark was still economically viable because the same use that persisted for fifty years was still valid and they 
could still earn a reasonable return on their investment. 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977).  
55 Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
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reasonable expectations.
56
 Moreover, there is not a taking when certain beneficial uses are 
prohibited, or when a current use is prohibited, as long as there are other beneficial uses available 
for the property.
57
  
 Rather, in deciding whether a taking has occurred, the Court will focus on the character 
of the action and whether there was an interference with rights in the parcel as a whole. 
58
 
Diminution in value alone does not affect a taking.
59
 When there is no physical invasion, the 
Court will consider the interference in the context of the investment-backed expectations and 
whether compensation is necessary to sustain it, as required by Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 
supra.
60
 However, Penn Central appears to raise the standard of what is required to find a taking 
that justifies payment of compensation in the absence of a physical invasion from Mahon.  
 The Court, in Kaiser Aetna, elaborated on the standard when there is a physical invasion. 
In that case, the Hawaii landowner expanded a natural pond to create a private marina.
61
 The 
ponds in that area of Hawaii were traditionally privately owned.
62
 The subject, Kuapa Pond was 
Kaiser Aetna.
63
 In its natural state, the pond filled and emptied along with the ocean tides,
64
 but 
the owner made improvements that included bridges, walls, and dredging that increased the 
depth of the pond.
65
 Marina lessees that lived in the community surrounding the pond paid fees 
that went toward maintaining the marina and providing security.
66
 The marina was controlled by 
                                                 
56 Id. at 125. 
57 See id. at 125-30. The Court cited Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); and Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) to provide 
examples of this proposition. 
58 Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
59 Id. at 131 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
60 Id. at 136. (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413). 
61 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 167 (1979). 
62 Id. at 166. 
63 Id. at 167. 
64 Id. at 166. 
65 Id. at 168. 
66 Id. 
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Kaiser Aetna and was used only once for a commercial use.
67
 
 The dispute arose with the Army Corps of Engineers, which maintained that the owner 
could not deny public access to the pond because it became the navigable water of the United 
States.
68
 First, the Court held that the marina did constitute “navigable waters” under federal law 
and that the Corps could require public access, but that would not mean there was no taking.
69
 
The Court did find a taking, arguing that where the owner purchases a private pond, it would be 
illogical for the owner’s investment in improvements would cause it to lose an essential property 
right—the right to exclude.70 The Court noted that usually government’s regulation and intrusion 
into navigable waters would not be a taking, but here, because the pond was not previously 
navigable and these waters were traditionally privately owned under Hawaii law, this case more 
appropriately fit into those of private landowners.
71
 Here, this was not a case of a loss of use due 
to a government regulation, but rather, the government was facilitating an actual physical 
invasion of the privately owned marina.
72
  
The next year, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Supreme Court established a two-prong 
test to determine whether there is a regulatory taking.
73
 There is no taking if the regulation 
“substantially advances a legitimate state interest” and does not “deny an owner economically 
viable use of his land.”74 In Agins, the city of Tiburon adjusted zoning ordinances that placed 
greater development restrictions on Agins’s property.75 Ultimately, the Court held that the state 
interest in preventing the unnecessary conversion of open space land to urban uses was 
                                                 
67 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 168. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 174. 
70 Id. at 176. 
71 Id. at 178-79. 
72 Id. at 180. 
73 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 257. 
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legitimate state interest, it was a proper exercise of police power, and finally, that it still allowed 
other uses and did not take away ownership.
76
 This general test formed the foundation of the test 
that is still used by the Supreme Court today.
77
 Though this framework was largely abrogated 
and expanded twenty-five years later in Lingle,
78
 this case is still important because it outlines 
the “substantially advance” test that the court applied in several subsequent cases. 
In Loretto, the Court announced its clearest standard for a physical taking. In that case, 
the Court determined whether a minor permanent invasion of an owner’s property constitutes a 
taking.
79
 New York state law required landlords to permit cable television companies to install 
cable lines on property and ask only for reasonable compensation determined by the statute.
80
 
The Supreme Court rejected the New York Court of Appeals’ finding that the exercise was 
justified under the police power as a legitimate public purpose that was within the state’s police 
power and held that there was a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment.
81
 
The Court also noted that it did not matter what public interests were served, but rather, the 
Court focused on whether there was a frustration of property rights under Penn Central, supra.
82
 
Here, the statute created a physical invasion, which is, no matter how small or minor, a taking, 
and thus, required compensation.
83
 A permanent physical invasion is a per se taking
84
 because 
the owner loses the right to exclude and the right to use the property, under Loretto.
85
  
Since Loretto there have been several takings cases, but it is important to address one 
                                                 
76 Id. at 261-62. 
77 Curtin, supra note 38, at 84. 
78 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005). Lingle addressed whether courts should use the Agins 
“substantially advances” test. Id. at 540-41. The court determined that the “substantially advances” test is derived 
from due process analysis and not a takings analysis. Id. There is no connection between whether a government 
action substantially advances a legitimate state interest and whether someone has lost their property. Id. at 543. 
79 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). 
80 Id. at 423-24.  
81 Id. at 425-26. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 427. 
84 Id. at 432. 
85 See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36. 
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more in this section because it deals with the Agins substantial advancement test. In Hawaii, 
Chevron entered into leases where it would lease gas stations to individual lessees and would 
require rent and a supply contract.
86
 Hawaii enacted legislation that prohibited the amount of rent 
that Chevron would be allowed to charge its lessees.
87
 The lower court struck down the statute, 
holding that it failed to “substantially advance a legitimate state interest” under Agins, arguing 
that it would not create any savings for consumers.
88
 The decision was upheld by the Ninth 
Circuit.
89
 Justice O’Connor, before addressing Agins, noted that the common theme throughout 
takings jurisprudence, as declared by Penn Central, Loretto, and Lucas, infra, is that  
 
“[e]ach aims to identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the 
classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts 
the owner form his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests focuses directly upon 
the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property 
rights.”90  
Finding that the “substantially advances” test does not fit into this mold, Justice O’Connor 
rejected it as a valid test within a takings analysis.
91
 The Court believed that this test fit better in 
the due process analysis from which it was originally derived—that it was best used to determine 
whether there was a proper interference in property rights or there was an arbitrary government 
action.
92
 The problem with the “substantially advances” formula was that it suggested that a 
regulation was valid if it achieved a legitimate public purpose, but that was not the proper 
consideration in determining whether private property was “taken” in violation of the Fifth 
                                                 
86 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532-33. 
87 Id. at 533. 
88 Id. at 534 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 57 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1014 (D.Haw. 1998)). 
89 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1033-37 (9th Cir. 2000). 
90 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
91 Id. at 540. 
92 Id. at 540-43 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928) (zoning ordinance “deprived him of his 
property without due process of law”); Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395). 
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Amendment.
93
 
As Justice Blackmun points out, “there is no set formula to determine where a regulation 
ends and a taking begins.” 94This principle has been consistent throughout takings caselaw.95 
And as Justice Blackmun argues
96
 it is strange that the court would set a rigid rule for a category 
of per se takings while denouncing any formula for determining whether a taking has occurred. 
While Lucas, infra, also establishes a standard for a category of per se takings, the Court’s 
dislike for any clear standard is ultimately the better practice. Unless the Court is willing to 
establish a standard with exceptions (thus weakening the standard itself), the reality is there will 
be cases that will be permanent physical invasions that really should not warrant compensation. 
Consider the Blue Line projects. These projects are designed to call attention to the 
potential effects of continued global warming and point out the amount of property damage (not 
dissimilar to the sand dune problem posed in this paper) that would occur as a result of a failure 
to take preventive measures.
97
 The Blue Line projects involve painting blue lines and beacons on 
the ground to illustrate how far sea levels could rise.
98
 But placing them on private property after 
Loretto presents a problem.
99
 One possible solution to get around Loretto would be to require 
them as an exaction on future development
100
, but this would probably not be effective on 
properties that have already been developed and no longer require permits; a similar problem 
                                                 
93 Id. at 542. 
94 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting (quoting Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594 (1962))). 
95 U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 77 (1913); United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 
357 U.S. 155, 183 (1958) (“The question whether there has been a taking cannot of course be resolved by general 
formulae, but must turn on the circumstances of each particular case.”); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Kaiser 
Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175; Agins, 447 U.S. at 260; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426; Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); see 
U.S. v. Causby, 328 United States 256, 274-75 (1946); see also Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960). 
The total list of cases that have either explicitly stated this principle or alluded to it is too numerous to mention here.  
96 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 442-43. 
97 See generally, Marc R. Poirier, A Very Clear Blue Line: Behavioral Economic, Public Choice, Public Art and Sea 
Level Rise, 16 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 83 (2007). 
98 Id. at 98. 
99 Id. at 103-04. 
100 Id. 
16 
 
exists with the sand dune projects because many owners are no longer looking to further improve 
their property in the near future, and thus, there is no reason for them to give into the exaction. 
Neither of these projects denies any substantial beneficial use of the owner’s whole 
property. Houses may be constructed, pools installed, and property enjoyed. Other than the literal 
government entrance for construction, the beach dune projects appear to be closer to land use 
regulations, similar to those in Palazzolo, infra. There is still a right to use the land, (though 
admittedly not the portion on which the dune sits), there is no right to public access, and there is 
still a right to dispose of the property. There hardly seems to be a substantial burden imposed on 
the owner, as described by Justice O’Connor.  
The public trust is another prime example of when a permanent physical invasion has 
been allowed, but there was no taking requiring compensation.
101
 Under the public trust doctrine, 
coastal areas are held in trust by the states, which hold the land for the benefit of all citizens, and 
any grants to private owners are made subject to the trust
102
, which of course opens Fifth 
Amendment questions. According to Archer et al., and discussed further below, the fact that the 
public trust doctrine is founded in common law principles preserves its use for regulation of 
privately owned property.
103
 The public trust doctrine and installation of sand dunes are similar 
in one crucial way: they both only place a limit on the rights of the owner as they pertain only to 
a portion of his property. 
In fact, the beach dune problem appears to be more like the alleged taking in Penn 
                                                 
101 See Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005). In that case, the private 
owner was required to grant a public easement across its property so the public could access the public beaches. 
There was no other point of access. No compensation was required and the case was determined on the grounds that 
the public had a right to access the beach, and that the interest of the private owner must cave to the public’s interest. 
This case is important here because there is a similar substantial public interest in building in maintaining sand 
dunes. Again, the public trust doctrine is another example where courts have found that there is not a substantial 
burden imposed on the owner’s rights. 
102 JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA’S COASTS 3-4 (1994). 
103 Id. at 78. 
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Central than it does to the taking in Kaiser Aetna, as the owner is not completely divested of any 
property rights. The owner was effectively deprived most of the use of airspace above his 
property, but that did not stop the Court from denying the takings claim—the owner was not so 
burdened that he could not benefit use his property as a whole or satisfy some of his investment-
backed expectations. The same is true in the present hypothetical case. By focusing on the 
burden imposed, as suggested in Lingle, it can hardly be said that the physical invasion would 
frustrate the private owners’ investment. It is possible that there can be some costs to the owner 
associated with the government action, but, on grounds further elaborated below, that does not 
justify a requirement of compensation.   
IV. Lucas, Palazzolo, and Background Principles 
 Not only do Lucas and Palazzolo deal with coastal regulations, there are also several 
other similarities between those cases and the hypothetical problem posed in this paper. As will 
be discussed in greater detail below, the character of the restriction more closely resembles the 
problem here.  
A. Lucas and Palazzolo 
The other form of categorical per se takings was established in Lucas. In that case, South 
Carolina imposed regulations that prevented Lucas from developing two beach front lots.
104
 
When he purchased them, the lost were not subject to permit requirements, but the Beach 
Management Act, which was adopted after the property was acquired, restricted development.
105
 
Justice Scalia listed the two types of categorical takings: where there is a “physical occupation of 
property” and where the owner loses “all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”106 
The Court noted what has come to be known as the “denominator problem” in which the Court 
                                                 
104 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09. 
105 Id. at 1008. 
106 Id. at 1015. 
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does not say whether the loss should be considered in light of the burdened parcel of property 
only or in the context of the entire property.
107
 It did say, however, that the question should e 
answered based on “how the owner’s reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State’s 
law of property.”108 This second form of categorical takings was justified on the grounds that 
total deprivation of beneficial amounts to the equivalent of a physical invasion.
109
 
However, the Lucas opinion is also noteworthy for an exception it adds to the analysis. 
Deprivation of all economic use does not require compensation where “inquiry into the nature of 
the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin 
with.”110 When he purchases property, an owner should naturally expect that there will be limits 
to his use, and those limits will be valid exercises of state police power.
111
 Justice Scalia’s 
language includes the principle that an owner cannot receive compensation on a theory of takings 
where there is a prior restraint restriction on use imposed either by statute or state common law 
on nuisance and property.
112
 These restrictions, which eliminate some takings claims, must be 
founded on background principles of property law that would impose the same restriction on the 
property as the regulation or action being challenged.
113
 New legislation is insufficient to prevent 
a taking if it the restriction is not inherent in the title itself and the state’s background principles 
of law.
114
 Justice Scalia focused on nuisance as the primary source for background principles of 
state law.
115
 This holding has created a threshold issue: if the right lost was already one that was 
prohibited when the owner purchased the property and not included in the property “bundle of 
                                                 
107 Id. at 1016 n.7. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1017. 
110 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027. 
111 Id. 
112 Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as 
Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005). 
113 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29. 
114 Id. at 1029. 
115 See, id. at 1029-30. 
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sticks,” there cannot possibly be a takings claim.116 
Rather than the strict interpretation of “background principles” that Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion espouses, other members of the Court would have relaxed the definition. Justice 
Kennedy would have focused on the owner’s reasonable expectations.117 According to him, the 
owners’ expectations are shaped by what courts deem to be valid government actions, and those 
rights are protected by Constitutional rules and customs.
118
 To Justice Kennedy, the restriction to 
nuisance is too narrow, and the definition must be broadened to include legal tradition so that a 
state can enact new regulations in response to changing conditions.
119
 Justice Stevens lamented 
the Court’s decision, stating that it “freezes the State’s common law, denying the legislature of 
its traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property.”120 He argued, 
similar to Justice Kennedy, that changing circumstances justify departures from common law 
that should not justify compensation.
121
 
Initially, Lucas was thought to carve out additional avenues for compensation other than 
the challenging one created by Penn Central.
122
 But the Lucas opinion has been interpreted 
narrowly and literally as demonstrated by Palazzolo which stated that a 93.7% drop in value was 
not sufficient to satisfy Lucas’s total loss of “economically beneficial use” test.123 In dicta, the 
Court addressed the denominator problem described above by treating the loss as a portion of the 
whole property and not finding a total loss for a portion of the property.
124
 
By the time the Court decided Palazzolo most states had decided that background 
                                                 
116 Blumm, supra note 112, at 326. 
117 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
120 Id. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
121 Id. at 1070 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
122 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 112, at 325. 
123 Id. at 325 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001)). 
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principles included statutes adopted before the current owner purchased the property.
125
 With 
Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court upheld the Lucas total takings standard, but 
cut a middle ground between Justice Scalia’s interpretation of “background principles and many 
states’ definitions. In this case, the petitioner owned about 20 acres of land along the Connecticut 
shoreline, much of which was salt marsh, which he wanted to fill in for development.
126
 The 
Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Program, which is charged with regulating coastal 
areas, designated the marshes on Palazzolo’s property as protected.127 After several attempts, 
Palazzolo’s 1985 submission was finally rejected because, as the Council noted, the proposal 
would conflict with the Management Plan and denied the application.
128
 Palazzolo filed a claim 
alleging the plan caused in a taking that deprived him of all economically beneficial use of his 
land.
129
 The Court held that Palazzolo did not satisfy the Lucas requirements because portions of 
the property could still be improved in compliance with the state’s management plan.130 It also 
noted that the ability to build a “substantial residence on the 18-acre property was more than a 
token interest that would leave the property “economically idle” under Lucas.131  
The Court rejected the states’ interpretation that a preexisting statute, per se, defeats a 
takings challenge.
132
 Passage of title does not transform what would be a taking into permanent 
loss of a property right, nor does a statute become a background principle merely be 
                                                 
125 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 112, at 355. 
126 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 613-14. 
127 Id. at 614. 
128 Id. 1971 R.I. Pub. Laws, ch. 279 § 1 et seq. established the Council, and § 210.3, as amended June 28, 1983, 
designated the land as protected. 
129 Id. at 616. 
130 Id. at 630-31. 
131 Id. at 631-32. In determining whether the Court could find a taking of a portion of the entire property, the Court 
considered several standards. Petitioner argued that he owned two distinct properties and that one was entirely taken. 
The Court was skeptical of this claim and contemplated considering the extent of the deprivation against the value of 
the property as a whole suggested by Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). 
The Court took a skeptical view of this rule in Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1016-17. Ultimately the Court did not reach a final 
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taking.  
132 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 112, at 356 (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S 630). 
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enactment.
133
 However, Justice Kennedy did leave open the door for inclusion of some, but not 
all statutes, that existed prior to the current owner’s purchase of the land. 134 Generally, a statute 
becomes a background principle where the type use of the property has traditionally been subject 
to regulation.
135
 The success of takings claims will vary, therefore, based on the particular 
property rights recognized in each state and the specific statute in question. 
These principles should govern whether sand dune projects constitute compensable 
takings. The circumstances of the cases decided by the Court most closely resemble the problem 
here. Moreover, the burdens on the property, as considered by Justice O’Connor in Lingle, are 
certainly not as heavy. On its face, it looks like a physical invasion (thus why a court may refrain 
from looking further), but a closer look suggests that this is more like a regulation. First, other 
than the placement of the dune, this scheme appears to be very similar to that of Palazzolo, in 
that it is a land use regulation, and that owners are prevented from doing anything with the small 
portion of the land, they cannot build on it, they may still fully utilize the remainder of their 
property, and they haven’t lost the right to exclude, except for allowing the government to enter 
for periodic maintenance. They may still make beneficial use of their property under Penn 
Central. There is a statutory scheme in place that would suggest these properties would be 
regulated, which should affect the owner’s expectations. Furthermore, the government has been 
routinely asked to preserve property and act for the benefit of the community when its interests 
clash with those of private owners, as discussed by the nuisance cases below and thus, this sort 
of action would qualify as a background principle of state law.  
While Loretto serves as precedent and the principle that the courts may grant 
compensation based on the theory that there has been a total taking (deprivation of economically 
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beneficial use) of a portion of the property, however, the trend seems to be in favor of Palazzolo 
for this type of action; the courts appear uneasy to grant compensation where the government’s 
purpose is environmental and property protection. Moreover, these cases are not like Loretto 
because there is no government action that provides benefits for a narrow number of actors and 
there is no forcing the owners to allow other private actors entry to their property. Additionally, 
the placement of dunes does not have a negative impact on the remainder of the property and 
there is no conferral of a benefit on a private third party.  
B. Application of the Background Principles Theory  
 Some states have interpreted the term “background principles” broadly, at the 
suggestion of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lucas, to incorporate statutory definitions 
of nuisance;
136
 and despite the majority’s sometimes rigid preference, the general pattern has 
been to follow the principle that property rights are evolving, a principle proffered by Justice 
Kenndy’s opinion and  Justice Stevens in his dissent, in which he states that property rules are 
not frozen in time and unevolving and specifically cites the a number of environmental 
protection statutes, including the Coastal Zone Management Act as examples.
137
 In some cases, 
the Court has declined to address situations where some of the Justices feel the statute was 
wrongly interpreted as a background principle by the state simply because it was adopted before 
                                                 
136 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 112, at 334; see generally, cases cited herein. Blumm and Ritchie also cite Kim v. 
City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997), stating that in identifying the background principles that should be 
applied, the court should also look at the statutes in effect when the owner obtained the property; Hunziker v. Iowa, 
519 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1994), holding that a statute protecting archaeological burial sites constituted a background 
principle; Colorado Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1994), which held that restrictions on uranium 
disposal did not constitute a taking because state common law nuisance did not allow the spread of radioactive 
material; Hendler v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 611 (1997), aff’d, 175 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999), holding the 
government installation of wells to monitor groundwater contamination was not a taking because the California code 
defined contamination as a public nuisance; and Keshbro, Inc. v. City of Miami, 801 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2001), which 
held that the city’s mandatory closure of a hotel was not a taking because “drug and nuisance activity had become 
‘inextricably intertwined’ with the hotel’s operation.” 
137 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 112, at 338 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also 
Lucas 505 U.S. at 1031.  
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the current owner purchased the property.
138
 But the Court does unequivocally say in Stop the 
Beach Renourishment v. Florida that “The Takings Clause only protects property rights as they 
are established under state law.”139 
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, the Supreme Court applied takings law to the beach 
protection plans.
140
 In Florida, the state owns, in a public trust, the land seaward of the mean 
high-tide line; everything above the line is owned privately.
141
 In Florida, private owners have 
property rights that include the right of access to the water, right to an unobstructed view, and the 
right to change property size if the mean high-tide line should move.
142
 If there is a sudden 
change that adds land to the shore, the additional land is owned by the state and not the property 
owner, even though the mean high-tide line might change.
143
 If there are additional accretions 
that follow an avulsion, the private owner no longer has rights to additional land.
144
 Florida 
constructed a scheme by which it replenished beaches destroyed by hurricanes and thus fixed the 
high-tide line as the “erosion control line” thereby fixing the border between the state’s property 
and private property.
145
  
A municipality and a county jointly submitted a plan that would add 75 feet of sand (by 
dredging) seaward of the erosion control line.
146
 The petitioner, a corporation formed by property 
owners along the shoreline, alleged an unconstitutional taking occurred because it lost two rights: 
                                                 
138 Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 112, at 348-49 (citing Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) 
(cert. denied (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari))) 
139Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. 130 S. Ct. 2592 , 2612 (2010). 
140 Id. 
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143 Id. at 2599. 
144 Id. 
145 Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2599. 
146 Id. at 2600. 
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the right to accretions and the right to have their property contact the water.
147
 The Florida 
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of avulsion applied and thus, the rights of the owners “were 
not implicated by the beach-restoration project.”148  The Court began its takings analysis by 
listing the various ways in which a taking can occur, but particularly mentioned that it is 
unconstitutional for a state to “recharacterize as public property what was previously private 
property.”149 The Court ultimately applied state law in determining that state had the right to do 
what it wanted with its own land; it was within its own rights as a property owner to expose new 
land that was held into the public trust.
150
  Furthermore, since the private owners had no rights to 
the lands exposed by avulsions, their rights to accretions were necessarily subject to the state’s 
right to fill in the land; it did not matter that the state caused the avulsion, as opposed to it 
occurring naturally.
151
 Thus the Court found the Florida’s application of the background 
principles to be proper and upheld the judgment.
152
 
 Several states apply the background principles theory to the public trust doctrine and 
have held that private owners cannot have any reasonable investment-backed expectations for the 
use of their property that are inconsistent with the purposes for which the state holds the land in 
trust.
153
 The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that construction blocking an adjacent owner’s 
access to the water does not constitute a public taking, stating, “the rights of riparian owners are 
subject to the prior right of the state to impose an additional public use upon lands without 
requiring the payment of additional compensation.”154 A similar decision in Washington State 
                                                 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (citing Walton Cnty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1116-18 (Fla. 2008)). 
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held that property purchased along the coast was purchased subject to the public trust doctrine.
155
 
 States have generally recognized these principles when dealing with dune and beach 
protection and replenishment. The Virginia Supreme Court followed Lucas’s principle that not 
all categorical takings are compensable.
156
 To be compensated an owner must first have 
possessed a property right where the state is affecting a right contained in the bundle when the 
owner acquired the property.
157
 The ordinance barring the removal of sand dunes in that case 
existed before the plaintiff acquired his beachfront property.
158
 Since the plaintiff never had the 
property right, the city could not have taken it away.
159
 A statutory prohibition is permissible to 
remove a right from the bundle before acquisition, and the Bell case differed from Lucas because 
there
160
, since the owner acquired the property before the regulation was adopted, the state would 
have to show common law principles of nuisance would have prohibited the use; that was not 
necessary in Bell because the regulation came first.
161
 
 In Just v. Marinette County, the Wisconsin Supreme court denied a takings claim when 
the county refused to grant a permit to fill in wetlands on the grounds that the state may 
permissibly restrict development on the shoreline in a way that changes the character of the 
shoreline.
162
 The purpose of the regulation is to ensure the navigable waters and coast are not 
destroyed due to uncontrolled use of the shorelands.
163
 The Justs owned wetlands that they 
wanted to fill in and develop.
164
 The court ruled that an owner’s rights over his land are not 
unlimited and it is reasonable, in the interest of protecting the public, “[to limit] the use of 
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private property to its natural uses.”165 The court recognized a public right to maintain the natural 
character of the shore area.
166
  
V. New Jersey Background Principles 
 The application of the background principles of state law is relatively straightforward. 
How the court solves the denominator problem will make a difference here. If it takes the same 
approach as the Court in Palazzolo and state that there is only a partial taking of the whole 
property, the analysis will have already ended because there is no denying that the owners can 
make beneficial use of the remainder of the property by building a house, for example. However, 
if the hypothetical court solves the denominator problem the other way, by finding a total taking 
of a portion of the property, then the analysis must continue. First, there must first be a 
determination of which principles constitute important facets of property law relevant here. 
Second, they must be applied in a manner consistent with Lucas and Palazzolo.  
In Pace Resources v. Shrewsbury Township, the Third Circuit held that there was no 
taking if there was still an economically viable use for the land.
167
 In Pace, residents of 
Shrewsbury were worried about industrial development, resulting in downzoning which 
prevented the plaintiff from completing construction of its industrial park. The court stated that 
statutes may frustrate certain reasonable investment-back expectations. Furthermore, 
expectations are only reasonable “if they take into account the power of the state to regulate in 
the public interest.”168 Subsequent cases have interpreted Pace to stand for the principle that 
reasonable expectations are frustrated only where a regulation has the same effect as the 
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destruction of a property right.
 169
  
The New Jersey Supreme Court already settled on the total takings analysis before the 
United States Supreme Court announced a similar analysis in Lucas. In Gardner, there was a 
challenge to an ordinance that restricted future development of residences and limited other 
property to agricultural and related uses.
170
 The restriction was imposed by the state’s statute 
intended to preserve the Pinelands.
171
 The court found that the statute protected public health and 
safety by preventing large numbers of development projects on environmentally-sensitive 
land.
172
 “Diminution of value itself does not constitute a taking,” the court noted and stated that a 
regulatory scheme is valid unless it “denies all practical use of property.”173 The court focuses on 
the economically viable uses allowed under the statute.
174
 A focus on difference in market value 
is not effective because it is “conjecturable and unmeasurable.” 175Therefore, since there was still 
economically beneficial use, there was no compensation required.
176
  
Gardner illustrates the facets of New Jersey takings law, which sets out a similar 
standard to Lucas and reinforced by Lingle
177
 that there must be a total taking. That thread is 
constant throughout New Jersey takings law. It is also recognized that owners must expect their 
rights to be limited by some regulations or restrictions and that they will not have unlimited use.  
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A.  Public Trust 
 Indeed, states often believe that they have an interest in controlling shoreline erosion.
178
 
One purpose, recognized by states that have stronger public trust doctrines, such as California 
and New Jersey, view shore maintenance and development restrictions as necessary to protecting 
property and preserving beach areas.
179
 In Florida, local governments may establish zoning and 
building restrictions that protect beaches and barrier dunes.
180
 It is also generally recognized that 
states may use their police power to regulate private lands. The New Jersey Supreme Court has 
repeatedly determined that, where necessary, the public must be granted an easement across 
private property so that it may access the publicly held beaches.
181
 Among those opinions is 
acceptance of the notion that there is limited public beach and that since it is so limited and so 
valuable, it is crucial that the courts carve out a right for the public to have access. 
 It is clear that the public trust doctrine is a well-engrained part of New Jersey property 
law and should be treated as a background principle. In those cases, there is no requirement of 
compensation for the fact that private owners must allow others access to their property so they 
may reach the foreshore and water. In those cases, there is arguable a greater loss to the private 
owners than in the sand dune cases. Under the public trust, the landowners lose their right to 
exclude, a right that has typically been held to be a crucial stick in the bundle of property rights. 
In the dune cases, the owners’ right to exclude is only slightly limited—they must only allow one 
other entity onto their property, the state, and the right is not limited, as the state may only enter 
to maintain the dunes. Based on the unique nature of beachfront property, a reasonable owner, it 
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can be argued, could not have expected that he would possess an unlimited right to exclude. It is 
well-founded in New Jersey courts that the public has an interest in that small portion of land 
that is directly adjacent to the beach and privately owned. A similar theory should be imposed 
with relation to the placement of sand dunes.  
 Generally, there is a significant amount of discussion among the cases cited above that 
the market value of the property will decline as a result of the government action, but that is 
never the primary consideration. After all, the Court has not always required compensation for 
the government’s action. One possible reason for doing so would be that the market does not 
always accurately reflect the specific rights that an owner may or may not have over his 
property. The market will always be more sensitive to certain rights than others, but the Court 
has not decided a taking occurred or did not occur because the loss was or was not reflected in 
market value (unless, of course, all value is eliminated). Here, it is unlikely that the possibility 
the owner will lose right to exclude to a public easement will have a significant effect on value, 
but the loss of view (discussed further below), which is not a crucial property right, will likely be 
reflected in market value. Surely, this is not the proper way to determine whether there is a 
compensable taking. Rather, the courts should focus on whether the owner had a reasonable 
expectation that he had the right. If not, there should be no compensation. 
B. Nuisance 
 Prohibitions on nuisances are well established by the United States Supreme Court and 
are explicitly recognized in Lucas and Palazzolo as background principles. In Miller v. Schoene, 
the state required the plaintiffs to cut down their cedar trees in order to prevent the 
communication of plant disease to apple orchards that were nearby.
182
 The statute under which 
the state was acting did not grant compensation for the value of the trees or decrease in market 
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value of the property without the trees.
183
 The statute declared that infected trees within a certain 
distance of an apple orchard to be a public nuisance and subject to destruction.
184
 Trees affected 
by a disease known as cedar rust could transfer the disease to apple trees within a two mile radius 
and the only practical means of preventing the spread was by cutting the trees down.
185
 The 
Court noted that the value of the apple trees and their fruits was far greater than that of the cedar 
trees, which had no noteworthy substantial value.
186
 The Court held that where the state is forced 
to choose between preservation of one class of property at the expense of another, it may choose 
to destroy the less valued property in order to save the one that is of greater public value.
187
 The 
courts should prefer the public interest over private property interests as a valid exercise of 
police power.
188
 
 In Goldblatt, Hempstead enacted an ordinance regulating excavating within its city 
limits. which effectively prevented the plaintiff from operating its business.
189
 The town 
expanded around the plaintiff’s mine, after it had largely been excavated, so that there were now 
many people living around it.
190
 In determining whether the town’s action was a valid exercise of 
police power, the Court would not consider whether the best economic use is prohibited.
191
 The 
Court instead will consider whether the regulation promotes the public interest and leaves the 
owner with other lawful uses for the property.
192
 Ultimately, the Court held that since the 
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plaintiffs could not show that the ordinance and its goals were unreasonable, the presumption of 
a valid exercise of police power remains.
193
 
New Jersey courts have similarly applied the takings principles listed above. In Usdin the 
Court held that where the state’s Department of Environmental Protection regulations prevented 
landowners from developing land was aimed at preventing injury or property loss of the plaintiff 
or his neighbors due to flooding, there was not a taking, but rather a prevention of the misuse of 
nature.
194
 The court applied the rule enunciated in A.M.G. Associates v. Springfield Tp.
195
 which 
stated that a zoning ordinance that effectively prohibited beneficial development on a small 
portion of the plaintiff’s land was not a taking because the plaintiff still had a large portion of his 
property to use as he wished.
196
 The Court also applied the holding in Just, supra and found 
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Pennsylvania Coal particularly helpful.197 Braindeis’s dissent was 
based on the opinion in Mugler and argued that the primary consideration should be whether the 
government action is designed to protect public health, not whether it is seeking to devote private 
property for public use.
198
 
In Bernardsville Quarry, another Lucas era case, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld 
an ordinance that limited the depth of quarry operations.
199
 In denying a permit to dig deeper and 
for other quarry-related activities, the municipality cited health, safety, and environmental 
concerns.
200
 The court recognized that municipalities have the general police power to regulate. 
In upholding the ordinance, the court relied on Keystone which stated that regulations of this type 
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of activity are valid if they legitimately established to protect the “public interest in heath, the 
environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area.”201 The court determined that the legislature 
reasonably came to the conclusion that the regulation was necessary to preventing the harm.
202
 
The court applied the Lucas test in Bernardsville Quarry and held there was no compensation 
necessary where the property could be put to other valuable use.
203
 
Bernardsville Quarry recognized that a taking can occur without compensation by 
stopping illegal or harmful activity.
204
 The public has an interest in preventing public nuisances 
and those takings do not require compensation.
205
 Where the risks of harm are substantial and the 
regulation is reasonably tailored to preventing that harm, there is a constitutional taking.
206
 In the 
dune cases, the lack of sand dunes can cause serious damage, as is evident as a result of 
Hurricane Sandy. The state has the ability to prevent harm to public property and may look at 
what is beneficial to the community under Goldblatt. The failure to allow dunes on their property 
constitutes a harmful and noxious use under Mugler and Lucas which must be fixed by the 
government. It is a common principle of takings law that the owner should expect he cannot use 
his property however he wants, and such an argument should be extended to sand dunes. 
C. Lateral Support 
Similarly, New Jersey has long recognized the right to lateral support. “Under the 
common law, a landowner who removes lateral support may be held liable for damage to 
improvements on an adjoining property.”207 Where the owner is not negligent, he must only 
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maintain support for neighboring land in its natural state.
208
 
Traditionally, the lateral support doctrine is applied to owners on elevated property, 
requiring downhill owners to use reasonable care maintain support to prevent land from sliding 
down the hill, thereby destroying the uphill neighbor’s property. While the doctrine has never 
been explicitly applied to flooding situations, the same principles should apply. Implicit in the 
argument for lateral support is that neighbors have a duty to each other to maintain their property 
in a way that avoids causing damage to their neighbor’s. In that vein, the argument for lateral 
support is similar that of nuisance. By refusing to allow the state or municipality to build a sand 
dune on their property, the beachfront owners are putting their neighbors at risk, and there is 
nothing their neighbors can do about it.  
The beachfront owners have the power to affect whether the inland owners’ properties 
will be severely affected by floods, and they are the only ones who can prevent it. Just like one is 
not allowed to do anything that will cause his neighbor’s land to slide downhill, he also should 
not be able to do anything that will cause his neighbor’s property to flood. That is what is 
happening here; the beachfront owners are trying to stop a scheme that will prevent their 
neighbor’s property from severe damage caused by flooding and storm surge. The government 
should be able to step in and construct dunes for that reason. Doing so would be for the owners 
to fulfill their duty to their neighbors and maintain their property in a way that avoids causing 
damage to a neighbor. 
D. New Jersey Beach Cases 
 Owners of beachfront property have brought numerous cases against municipalities 
alleging that beach protection ordinances create compensatory takings. That was the case in 
Spiegle, where the plaintiffs owned four lots in Beach Haven and an ordinance used the state’s 
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police power to protect sand dunes.
209
 The plaintiffs alleged that the regulations were so strict 
that they would only be able to get minimal use from their land.
210
 The court noted the difficulty 
in carving out a regulatory takings test to determine when compensation is required because the 
municipality is no longer lawfully acting within its police power.
211
 As this decision was made 
well before the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas, the court determined that there was no taking 
because the plaintiffs failed to show a viable economic use for the property that would not create 
a dangerous condition to both the shore and the structure itself.
212
 
New Jersey state laws also have a history of protecting sand dunes and beach areas. For 
example, Coastal Area Facility Review Act, originally enacted in 1973, was updated in 1993. 
The purpose was to allow the state to regulate development in the coastal area, but the original 
statute allowed small buildings to be constructed without much regulation. The updated statute 
now requires permits for all structures that will be built near the beach or the dunes, with less 
strict requirements for structures to be built farther away.
213
 
 In Seven Mile Island, the Borough of Avalon adopted an ordinance that would protect its 
beaches and dunes after repeated storm damage.
214
 In order to receive funds for beach protection 
from the state, Avalon may not allow construction of swimming pools in dune areas.
215
 The court 
found the ordinance to be valid because it was a reasonable measure used to protect the beaches, 
an important interest, it said, because “the dunes are the island’s first line of defense against 
future damage.”216 A similar case stated that any challenge to a municipal ordinance that protects 
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dunes must show that the ordinance “unduly burdens the beneficial use of the land.”217 
The takings law regarding dune placement, reconstruction, and protection are not 
definitive in New Jersey. A taking has been found in state court where the placement of a dune 
on private property denies the owner of the property all use of their land.
218
 In another case, 
Klumpp, the plaintiffs’ loss of property was deemed to be a total taking by regulation and 
physical invasion because their entire property had been incorporated into the beach construction 
scheme and was covered by sand dunes in a way that prevented them from constructing anything 
on their property.
219
 The government action in these cases would satisfy the Lucas analysis that 
requires compensation where all economic uses is lost, but these cases do not address the more 
current actions that place sand dunes at the edge of property and still allow the construction of, in 
some cases, a substantial residence. 
A focus on loss in value has been the focus in some cases.
220
 Harvey Cedars v. Karan 
focused on loss of view and awarded compensation for the loss, but that is an improper 
consideration. The right to a view has never been held to be an essential property right. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court has never decided whether a loss of view is compensable as a taking
221
, 
but the arguments against are compelling. Primarily, there should be no compensation because 
there is no nexus between a permanent physical invasion and a loss of view
222
. Owners that are 
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further inland do not have a reliable remedy against those who build closer to the water and 
block the view. Nor would they have a remedy against the state were it to construct a dune on the 
seaward side of the border between the private owner’s property and the publicly held beach.  
Ultimately, New Jersey cases provide a mixed-bag of results. No precedent is on point to 
direct the court or indicate how the court will hold. There is precedent for maintaining beach 
dune regulations as suggested by Spiegle. However, there are cases that have found a taking, 
such as Klumpp. It appears that cases in which the dune was present before the current owner 
purchased the property are decided in favor of the government. But there is no substantial 
difference between an owner that purchases a property with a dune and one whose property has a 
dune placed on it. They both have the same rights—their right to exclude has been limited, but 
not revoked—and they also have the same loss of view. It would be illogical to treat these 
owners differently. No case has dealt explicitly with the scenario outlined by this paper’s 
hypothetical problem or the one in Harvey Cedars.  
VI. Conclusion 
 The municipal construction of sand dunes on private property will likely be deemed a 
physical invasion, and thus will not reach the Lucas takings analysis. But that does not mean they 
shouldn’t. This government action’s character is similar to that of a regulation than it is a 
singling out of one property, entering to it to take it for governmental use, and leaving the burden 
on one property owner.  This is a government action that should be shared by the community, 
and if a court sees fit, it may be appropriate to implement a tax scheme that requires inland 
owners to pay a little more than the beachfront owners so they share the burden too. 
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 Thus, courts should consider the analysis presented above. One of the crucial pillars of 
property law is that one cannot use his property in a way that harms his neighbor. That is exactly 
what is happening here. Beachfront owners should not get compensation from the government 
when the must allow placement of a sand dune because the government is acting in the public 
interest and it is not the type of action that typically warrants compensation. 
